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Abstract
The development of the safety critical systems of future com-
mercial vehicles is mainly driven by the social demand, that the
societies want to see safer, more reliable vehicles on the roads,
which can also handle more complex situations than human
driver can. It is questioned whether the approaches of the clas-
sical reliability theory are appropriate for redundant electronic
systems, especially if they have a safety-critical nature, such as
the electronic brake system, which has been used in commercial
vehicles in Europe for almost a decade.
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1 Introduction
Reliability theory has become one of the important areas
in Systems Engineering. Any system analysis, in order to be
complete, must give due consideration to system reliability and
availability. A system designer is often faced by the problems
of evaluation and improvement of system reliability and deter-
mination of optimum preventive maintenance schedule. In the
solution of these problems, he is largely aided by mathematical
models [1, 2].
Reliability is mainly determined according to the ability of the
given part or assembly or system to withstand the non-foreseen
overloading without catastrophic failures. Reliability of vehi-
cle elements (system, sub-system, assemblies, sub-assemblies,
parts), especially of those critical in respect of reliability, is in-
creasingly becoming the subject of special attention of vehicle
designers and automotive industry in general [3].
Stand alone safety systems (ABS – Anti-lock Braking Sys-
tem, airbag, ESP - Electronic Stability Program) are distributed
functions inside a vehicle, which communicate with each other,
but not strongly integrated at the moment. By the integration of
modern electronic technologies and a well-implemented chas-
sis control (Referring to Péter [4, 5]) into an intelligent system,
a fully electronically controlled power train, the overall traffic
safety and traffic efficiency for heavy goods vehicles can be im-
proved [6]. The by-wire technologies offer functional as well as
design benefits, but their application in safety-critical systems,
such as brake and steering requires special care during the de-
sign and release process.
2 Brake System Architectures of HGV Today
Concerning the level of redundancy, these systems have a sin-
gle electronic circuit (which controls all modulators) and – as a
definite customer requirement – also double pneumatic circuit as
a back-up system. In case of a single failure in the electronic cir-
cuit, depending on the severity of the occurred failure, the sys-
tem switches back into a partial or a full back-up mode, in which
concerning the basic brake function, there is a full redundancy.
This layout fulfils the related legislative requirements (see be-
low), but in the full pneumatic back-up mode several functions
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are not available. Such a system is called 1E+2P (one electronic
circuit, two pneumatic circuits).
Because of cost and design constraints, there is a continuous
discussion about leaving one of the pneumatic circuits from the
system, since the related standards can also be fulfilled with a
1E+1P layout, meaning that the pneumatic back-up circuit ei-
ther from the trailer control valve (part of TCM - Trailer Control
Module) or from the rear axle can be cancelled or from both.
The table below, Fig. 1 shows most of the possible layouts for
1E+2P (but no back-up on the rear axle or in the trailer con-
trol valve) with two-circuit pneumatic foot brake valve (part of
FBM - Foot Brake Module), and also the 1E+1P layouts, where
the foot brake valve has only a single circuit.
The 2 1E+1P layouts fulfil the legislative requirements keep-
ing the fail-safe nature of the basic brake system of the vehicle
(this means that the system will provide the in legislation re-
quired reduced brake performance in case of a single failure).
However, if the electronic circuit is not intact, no functions like
ABS, brake force distribution, etc. are available.
The 1E+1P architecture, however, would not suit the pur-
poses of the automatic driving, since external brake actuation
is not possible in the pneumatic back-up mode. This means that
from this perspective the system is neither fail-tolerant nor fail-
safe. In order to handle the problem of the automatic drive (or
so called platooning) problem, a fully fail-tolerant, redundant
brake system has been developed in the framework of the EU
supported Chauffeur-2 project. Although the system is fully fail-
tolerant, its realization in the practical life is difficult, primarily
because of the very high costs. Nevertheless, it was a very use-
ful exercise in order to understand the requirements for such a
system, and many other, lower safety requirement applications
can be deducted from that.
Although the 2E brake system architecture of PEIT (EU
project, 5th Frame Program) is not fully fail-tolerant (at least
in the classical sense – all functions are provided without any
performance reduction in case of a single failure), but this archi-
tecture provides several features, which result in enhanced sys-
tem performance even if – as a consequence of a single failure –
one of the circuits is not intact, and as such, provides enhanced
safety in comparison to the 2P, 1E+2P and 1E+1P systems [6].
In case of the 1E+2P or 1E+1P system a single failure poten-
tially leads to a non-functioning electronic circuit, which from
the system performance viewpoint means the loss of all extra
functions, since the typical brake functions (load sensing, cou-
pling force control, ABS, ESP, slip control, but the basic brake
function remains) are realized only electronically. The 2E archi-
tecture – where all functions are being computed in both ECUs
– can provide several functions even on the partially disabled
hardware.
If the front axle control circuit fails, the rear axle can realize
functions like ABS, ATC, DTC, load proportioning, etc. Some
part of the ESP functionality would also be possible (understeer
compensation). Similarly, in case of the rear axle control circuit
failure the front axle brake control can realize functions, which
are in pneumatic mode not available, such as tilt, ABS on the
front axle, some ESP functionality (compensation of the over-
steered behaviour), brake assistant functions can be provided.
In both cases the trailer control (CFC – Coupling Force Con-
trol, roll-over prevention function), the engine and retarder con-
trol (non-friction brake integration) functions are fully available,
thus reducing the load on the friction brake and providing the
trailer stability.
3 Structural Reliability Analysis of Brake Systems
Several evidences show that the occurrence probability of sin-
gle and multiple vehicle accidents has improved with the intro-
duction of active safety functions such as antilock braking, trac-
tion control and electronic stability programs. These encourag-
ing results have created expectations that in the future new ac-
tive safety functions will result in further safety improvements
in vehicle technology. At the same time, though, there is a grow-
ing recognition that any new technologies are likely to introduce
new risks which therefore need to be identified, analysed and ef-
fectively contained.
Active safety systems address known safety problems but also
introduce new classes of potentially hazardous failure modes.
In a traditional design, for example, a commission failure such
as the inadvertent application of brakes on a single wheel of
the car is impossible. This condition becomes possible, how-
ever, in a design that enables independent electronic control of
wheel brakes. Active safety functions that control such brakes
are of course carefully designed to fail-silent in case of detected
malfunctions. Although the likelihood of commission failures
can be reduced via good design, the potential still remains. The
severity and probability of occurrence of these and other failure
modes likely to arise from the introduction of new technologies
in vehicles, therefore, need to be carefully considered to ensure
safe deployment of such technologies.
Understandably, such radical design changes raise serious
safety concerns and demand the thorough safety evaluation of
any new design concepts. Potential failure modes must be iden-
tified and the effects of them in the provision of sensitive active
safety functions must be established [7].
3.1 Reliability Design
To increase system reliability, the system designer may con-
sider component redundancy because under certain conditions,
it may be the quickest or the easiest solution or the solution with
the least cost or the only solution. On the other hand, redun-
dancy has the following disadvantages: it might be too expen-
sive or it may exceed limitations on size, weight or power or
it may require sensing and switching devices so complex as to
offset the advantages [1].
Reliability design in the concept design phase is primarily
oriented towards defining of reliability specification and select-
ing of the most acceptable solution from the point of view of
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Rear axle with backup Rear axle without backup
TCM with 2P TCM with 1P TCM with 2P TCM with 1P
FBM with
2P+1E
FBM with
1P+1E
Fig. 1. Possible layouts for brake systems in terms of their back-up
reliability meeting requirements, what means that reliability of
systems and their elements is analysed. The process of system
designing is started by translating the users’ requirements and
needs into the specification for designing, i.e. into the design
assignment within creating the pre-design. The concept design
phase also defines the design goals from the point of view of
meeting the standards and regulations.
Conducting the analysis of failure mode, effects (FMEA) en-
ables identifying all potential and known modes of failure oc-
currences in system assemblies/parts, their causes, evaluation of
consequences. Individual system elements (subsystem, assem-
bly, part) can have several failure modes, since each stipulated
function can have several failure modes. Failure modes are al-
located, according to the required function, into three groups:
complete function loss, partial function loss and wrong func-
tion, and this is important for conducting the FMEA method.
For each failure mode, the possible effect (consequence) is anal-
ysed at a higher level, i.e. at the whole system level [1].
3.2 Well-structured Qualitative Reliability Methodology –
(MX) FMEA
Before starting the FMEA, it is worth deploying the customer
requirements to design specification level. For that purpose, sev-
eral tools are available, one of them is the Matrix Analyses from
Plato, which seems to be very powerful in safety critical appli-
cations.
The advantages of using matrix analysis over representing the
system in a structure tree lie in the fact that the function, failure
and system structures are set up almost simultaneously and that
functional relationships are indicated within the matrix.
At the system level, only customer needs or regulatory re-
quirements and the functions by which they are met are mapped
to subsystems (Table reftab:1). No components are mapped or
analysed at the system level.
The structure of each matrix is based on the answers to three
questions:
• What is the system or product to be analysed?
• What customer needs/expectations, regulatory requirements,
standards, etc. are associated with such a system or product
Tab. 1. Top-level representation of the requirements for a redundant elec-
tronic semi-trailer brake system (extract)
SPARC semi-trailer system Legal Customer Internal
Requirements
ABS status info ×
RSP status info ×
Yellow warning signal required ×
Red warning signal required ×
Automatic landing leg control ×
Keep target level of chassis height ×
Assure manual handling (LL) ×
Compressor control ×
(functions and/or requirements)?
• What subsystems make up the system or product? And which
functions correspond to these subsystems (directly or indi-
rectly)?
Using this approach, primary functions that are developed us-
ing software are mapped to subsystems of a redundant electronic
brake system and then linked and marked to their influences on
the requirements for the overall system in the matrix (Table 2)
which shows a certain subsystem classification concerning an
EU-project1. These links indicate direct relationships (via ‘func-
tion’) and indirect relationships (via ‘failure’ only).
The requirements, that the relevant components must meet
in order to fulfil a function, are mapped at interfaces (Fig. 2).
An interface is both a means of separating system from design
and a means of linking the two. Interfaces make it possible for
the teams to work independently at different locations. Design
and System FMEAs can run parallel to each other up to a cer-
tain stage of the development process and then the conception
FMEA (how the whole complex system is influenced by each
component) can be executed [8].
There are many benefits of performing FMEA, including a
systematic approach to classify hardware failures,it reduces de-
velopment time and cost,it reduces engineering changes, it is
easy to understand, serves as a useful tool for more efficient
1SPARC – Secure Propulsion using Advanced Redundant Control (6th
Frame Program)
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Tab. 2. System and function matrix (extract) Semi-trailer CTC1 AM12 AM2 AM3 ASU3 NRG4 TAUX5
ABS status info × × × × ×
RSP status info × × × × ×
Yellow warning signal required × × × × × ×
Red warning signal required × × × × × ×
Automatic landing leg control × × × ×
Keep level of chassis height × × × ×
Assure manual handling (LL) × × ×
Compressor control × × ×
1 Central Trailer Controller; 2 Axle Module; 3 Air Supply Unit; 4 Energy Unit; 5 Trailer Auxiliary Unit
Fig. 2. Representation of the levels involved in
System and Design FMEAs with defined interface [8]
test planning, highlights safety concerns to be focused on, im-
proves customer satisfaction. It is an effective tool to analyse
small, large, and complex systems, is useful in the development
of cost-effective preventive maintenance systems, provides safe-
guard against repeating the same mistakes in the future, useful
to compare designs, a visibility tool for manager, a useful ap-
proach that starts from the detailed level and works upward, and
useful to improve communication among design interface per-
sonnel [9].
3.3 Quantitative Analysis of Structural Reliability
If availability is thought of in terms of a repairable system be-
ing ‘up’ and ‘down’ then a number of concepts and terms can be
defined using the mathematical apparatus of probability theory
and reliability theory [10]. From this point of view the reliability
of a system is usually understood as the probability of fail-safe
operation during a defined period of time. The reliability of
HGV brake systems can be examined using the models describ-
ing systems that are composed of items requiring non-negligible
repair times.
In the following we assume (referring to Prezenszki and Vár-
laki [11]) that the operation times are independent random vari-
ables, and that the operation times are having the same prob-
ability distribution. Similarly, the repair times are considered
independent random variables with the same distribution during
a given period of operation. Namely, we are given the distribu-
tion function of operation times F(t) with mean value T1 and
variance σ 21 , and also the distribution function of repair times
G(t) with mean value T2 and variance σ 22 .
The measure of reliability of an item requiring non-negligible
repair times is the so-called availability coefficient A(t) that is
the probability of actual working of the given element at moment
t . It can be calculated using the following stationary expression
(if a “sufficiently long period” is passed):
Ae = limt→∞ A(t) =
T1
T1 + T2 , (1)
where
• T1 is the so-called Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), that
is, the average ‘up’ time,
• T2 is the so-called Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), that is, the
average time to restore to the ‘up’ state.
In non-stationary case the availability coefficient is the fol-
lowing:
A(t) = 1− F(t)+
∫ t
0
[1− F(t − x)] h(x)dx, (2)
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where h(x) is the density function of resurrection [11].
h(x) =
∞∑
n=1
8n(x),
8n(t) =
∫ t
0
Fn(t − x)dGn(x),
Fn(t) =
∫ t
0
Fn−1(t − x)dF(x),
Gn(t) =
∫ t
0
Gn−1(t − x)dG(x),
where n is the number of failures until time t .
It is a common assumption in the reliability analysis of ve-
hicle mechanical parts that operation and maintenance intervals
follow exponential rules
• operation time: F(t) = 1− e−λt , and
• maintenance (or repair) time: G(t) = 1− e−µt .
Now, in stationary case the availability coefficient is
Ae = µ
λ+ µ, (3)
and in non-stationary case
A(t) = µ+ λe
−(λ+µ)t
µ+ λ . (4)
In the above expressions
• 1/λ = T1 is the mean time of normal operation (MTBF),
• 1/µ = T2 is the mean time to repair (MTTR).
It is much more important to determine the probability R(τ )
of operation during an interval τ (that is the so-called reliability
coefficient). In non-stationary case
Rt (τ ) = 1− F(t + τ)+
∫ t
0
[1− F(t + τ − x)] h(x)dx, (5)
and in stationary case
Re(τ ) = limt→∞ Rt (τ ) =
1
T1 + T2
∫ ∞
τ
[1− F(x)] dx . (6)
In stationary case, using the exponential hypothesis for opera-
tion and maintenance times:
Re(τ ) = µ
µ+ λe
−λτ . (7)
Serial coupling between parts. In this case the failure of
every individual element forces the whole system into ‘down’
state. The availability coefficient (probability of operation at
time t) can be approximately calculated as [11]
Aserial = 1
1+∑nk=1 Tk2Tk1 , (8)
where
• n is the number of parts in the system,
• Tk1 is the mean time of operation for part k, and
• Tk2 is the mean time of repair for part k.
The reliability (probability of operation during interval τ ) can
be expressed as
Rserial(τ ) = Aserial e−τ/T1 , (9)
where
T1 = 1∑n
k=1 1Tk1
.
If the exponentiality holds for operation and maintenance/repair
times, then the above expressions are accurate.
Parallel coupling between parts. In this case the failures of
individual elements do not affect the reliability of the others:
the failures of elements are independent, moreover, they can be
repaired independently of each other.
Now, in stationary case the availability of the whole system
(that is the probability that every individual element is operating
at time t) is [11]:
Aparallel = T11T11 + T12 ·
T21
T21 + T22 · · ·
Tn1
Tn1 + Tn2 =
n∏
i=1
Ti1
Ti1 + Ti2
(10)
where
• n is the number of parts in the system,
• Ti1 is the mean time of operation for part i , and
• Ti2 is the mean time of repair for part i .
If the architecture of the system is redundant in the sense that
there are homogenous (i.e. similarly reliable) parts coupled par-
allel, one can calculate the probability of operation of k parts
among the total number of n at a given time t :
Ak =
(
n
k
)
Ake(1− Ae)n−k, (11)
where
• Ae is the availability coefficient (in stationary case).
Furthermore, the probability of operation of k parts among the
total number of n during a given period τ (in stationary case):
Rk(τ ) =
(
n
k
)
Re(τ )k (1− Re(τ ))n−k . (12)
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Mixed coupling between parts. In reality, brake systems
are composed of serially coupled sub-systems that have differ-
ent reliability characteristics. These sub-systems in some cases
can be subdivided into similarly reliable parts (having the same
functionality) that are coupled parallel therefore realizing fail-
tolerance. Thus the structure of the whole system is mixed,
and the derivation of availability or reliability coefficients for
the whole system requires the application of difficult analytic
calculations and (in several cases) numerical simulations.
4 Conclusion
Nowadays during analysing more and more mainly electron-
ically complex automotive systems, the question of the most
suitable reliability analysis method has arisen. In this paper
two accepted techniques were presented giving hints to a well-
structured system analysis. Depending on the aim of the analysis
the right reliability analysis tool has to be chosen or in case of
complex analysis, more tools should be used at one time sup-
porting each other.
References
1 Srinivasan SK, Subramanian R, Probabilistic Analysis of Redundant Sys-
tems, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1980.
2 Ebeling CE, An Introduction to Reliability and Maintainability Engineering,
Mcgraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997.
3 Popovic´ P, Ivanovic´ G, Design for reliability of vehicles in the concept
phase, EAEC Congress, 2005.
4 Péter T, Gépjármu˝ lengo˝rendszerek felfüggesztésparamétereinek opti-
málása, MTA, Budapest, 1997. Kandidátusi értekezés.
5 , Mathematical Transformations of Road Profile Excitation for Vari-
able Vehicle Speeds, Studies in Vehicle Engineering and Transportation Sci-
ence, 2000, pp. 51–69.
6 Armbruster M, Bäuerle K, Reichel R, Maisch A, Spiegelberg G, X-By-
Wire systems of the next generation, AVEC International Symposium, 2004.
7 Papadopoulos Y, Grante C, Wedlin J, Automating aspects of safety design
in contemporary automotive system engineering, FISITA Conference, 2004.
8 Dobry A, Think globally, act locally, FMEA: Effective handling of complex
systems.
9 Dhillon BS, Design reliability: Fundamentals and Applications, CRC Press
LLC., 1999.
10 Robinson RM, Anderson KJ, SIL Rating Fire Protection Equipment: Con-
ferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology, 8th Australian
Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software (SCS’03).
11 Prezenszki J, Várlaki P, A raktári anyagmozgatási géprendszerek meg-
bízhatósági és kapacitásvizsgálata, GÉP XXX (March 1978), no. 3, 85-92.
Per. Pol. Transp. Eng.56 Timea Fülep / László Palkovics / László Nádai
